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Note
Federal Preemption and the Rating Agencies:
Eliminating State Law Liability to Promote
Quality Ratings
Timothy M. Sullivan*
In July 2009, the California Public Employees' Retirement
System (CalPERS) sued Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch,
the three major credit rating agencies, in California state court
for an unstated amount of damages.' CalPERS, a multibillion
dollar investor,2 invoked California common law in alleging
that the rating agencies acted negligently by stamping inap-
propriately high ratings on subprime mortgage-backed securi-
ties, thereby signaling, falsely, that the securities were safe in-
vestments.3 CalPERS alleged that it purchased these securities
in reliance on the ratings.4 When these securities collapsed,
CalPERS suffered a substantial loss-perhaps as much as one
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Professor Claire Hill for her guidance in writing this Note. Many thanks also
to the editors of the Minnesota Law Review, including Nate Brennan, Lindsey
Eastman, Jessica Edwards, and Joe Hansen, for their constructive edits and
comments. Finally, thanks to Amanda, Alayna, and Quinn for their enduring
patience, support, and inspiration. Copyright D 2010 by Timothy M. Sullivan.
1. Complaint for Negligent Misrepresentation Under Common Law &
California Civil Code §§ 1709 & 1710 & Negligent Interference with Prospec-
tive Economic Advantage at 23, Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Moody's
Corp., No. CGC-09-490241 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. July 9, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter CalPERS Complaint]; Leslie Wayne, Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securi-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at B1.
2. CalPERS at a Glance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, http://articles.latimes
.com/2010/feb/Olbusiness/la-fi-calpers-glanceboxl-2010Feb01 ("[CalPERS] cur-
rently has an investment portfolio of $203 billion in stocks, bonds, real estate,
private equity, commodities and infrastructure investments.").
3. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 1, at 21-22.
4. See id. ("[T]he Rating Agencies owed a duty to CalPERS, which relied
on their ratings .... ).
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billion dollars.5 To recover this loss, CalPERS focused its litiga-
tion efforts on the rating agencies. 6
Meanwhile, Congress is considering various proposals to
change the federal regime for regulating the rating agencies.7
These proposals address perceived problems in the rating in-
dustry in various ways. Some would require the rating agencies
to adopt specific methodologies prescribed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).8 Others would require rating
agencies to provide greater disclosure of rating methodologies. 9
Still others would alter the manner in which rating agencies
are compensated.10 Finally, some proposals would make it easi-
er for rating agencies to be sued under federal law." No pro-
posal addresses the normative desirability of allowing the state
law claims like those made in the CalPERS suit to go forward.
The CalPERS suit raises important questions that Con-
gress should consider in determining how best to regulate the
rating agencies: Should the rating agencies be subject to state
law liability for ratings that turn out to be inaccurate? How
might state law liability for inaccurate ratings affect the quali-
ty, that is, accuracy, of future ratings? To answer these ques-
tions, one must consider the purpose of ratings. Credit ratings
reduce information asymmetry between investors and invest-
ment issuers, thereby promoting efficient markets. 12 More spe-
5. Id. at 1; Marc Lifsher & Jerry Hirsch, CalPERS Sues 3 Rating Firms
over Its Losses, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at B2.
6. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 1, at 2; see also Lifsher & Hirsch, su-
pra note 5 (describing both the "plaudits and skepticism" surrounding the law-
suit).
7. See H.R. 3890, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3214, 111th Cong. (2009);
H.R. 2549, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1073, 111th Cong. (2009).
8. H.R. 3890 § 2(11) (setting forth methodologies and minimum disclo-
sure requirements the SEC would be required to impose on the rating agen-
cies).
9. H.R. 2549 § 2(2) (suggesting that the rating agencies engage in proce-
dures to be more clear, consistent, and reliable).
10. H.R. 3890 § 2(6) (stating that compensation should ensure indepen-
dence of the director's judgment).
11. H.R. 3214 § 4 (easing the pleading requirements for federal securities
claims against rating agencies); S. 1073 § 4 (same).
12. See Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of the Rat-
ing Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 294 (1996) ("Efficient capital markets need accurate in-
formation to insure optimal choices by investors and to assure that money
flows to those who are able to use it most effectively."); St6phane Rousseau,
Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclo-
sure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617, 620 (2006) ("[Rating Agencies] have
2010] 2137
2138 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:2136
cifically, credit ratings provide investors with a succinct opinion
of the creditworthiness of a particular company, government
entity, security, or other financial product. 13 Discerning the op-
timal liability regime for rating agencies requires consideration
of such a regime's likely effect on ratings quality.
Over the past century, the credit rating industry grew ex-
ponentially. 14 Aided by the incorporation of privately issued
ratings into government securities regulations, the industry
that began by rating railroad bonds now stands as a central fa-
cet of the world financial system.15 Despite the tremendous in-
fluence of credit ratings in the modern financial system,16 the
agencies that produce these ratings enjoy minimal government
regulation' 7 and little exposure to liability.'8 This could soon
change. The bursting of the real estate market bubble precipi-
tated a collapse of financial products collateralized by residen-
tial mortgages.19 Virtually all of these products bore ratings
emerged as informational intermediaries specializing in the appraisal of the
creditworthiness of corporations.").
13. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS 5
(2003) ("[A] credit rating reflects a rating agency's opinion, as of a specific
date, of the creditworthiness of a particular company, security, or obligation.");
Rhodes, supra note 12, at 294-95.
14. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 13, at 5 (finding that rat-
ing agencies increased their market because of the growing reliance on their
reports and the globalization of financial markets).
15. See Rhodes, supra note 12, at 294; Op-Ed., The Moody's Blues, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at A14 (noting that one major rating agency's twenty per-
cent annual growth until recently was due to "government help").
16. As famously quipped by New York Times columnist Thomas Fried-
man, "there [are] two superpowers in the world-the United States and Moo-
dy's bond-rating service-and it [is] sometimes unclear which [is] more power-
ful." Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008,
(Magazine), at 36.
17. See Kenneth S. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dy-
namics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1674
(2008) ("[Inn 2006 federal legislation imposed a small measure of regulatory
oversight on rating agencies, which until then were essentially unregulated.").
18. See id. at 1687 ("[R]ating agencies have been eminently successful in
avoiding liability on account of allegedly incorrect ratings they issue."); Arthur
R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 352 (2006) ("[C]redit rating agencies have gen-
erally been able to avoid liabilities .... .").
19. See CDOh No!, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2007, at 90 (noting that mort-
gage-backed investment losses in late 2007 were "set to rise sharply as mort-
gage defaults in America climb").
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produced by one of the major agencies. 20 In many instances, the
agencies gave these now-illiquid products their highest rating,
indicating a very low risk of default and corresponding loss of
value.21 Many of these ratings turned out to be incorrect.22 As
foreclosure rates skyrocketed throughout the country, the value
of mortgage-backed securities nose-dived. 23 Numerous inves-
tors, perhaps having relied on credit rating assurances that
mortgage-backed products were safe, suffered substantial
losses. 24
Not surprisingly, rating agencies face increased scrutiny
resulting from the collapse of mortgage-backed investments. 25
Congress is considering new legislation regarding the rating
agencies,26 and aggrieved investors, most notably CalPERS,
have commenced major litigation stemming from losses alleged-
ly caused by inaccurate ratings.27 Historically, lawsuits against
rating agencies have been unsuccessful, with few exceptions.28
Rating agencies traditionally rely on the First Amendment 29
20. See id. ("Most CDOs were engineered to provide both yield and safety,
with a thick band of each rated AAA or even better .....
21. See id.
22. See Floyd Norris, A Debacle That Has Wall Street in the Dark, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C1 (explaining that the market for mortgage-backed
investments "collapsed when it became clear the rating agencies had been
overly optimistic").
23. See CDOh No!, supra note 19, at 90 (describing the billions in losses
that big banks are suffering as a result of the collapse of mortgage-backed in-
vestments); Kevin LeCroix, Can Investors Blame the Rating Agencies for Mort-
gage Investment Losses?, THE D&O DIARY, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.dandodiary
.com/2007/1 1/articles/subprime-litigation/can-investors-blame-the-rating-agencies
-for-mortgage-investment-losses/index.html (noting that subprime investment
related losses may reach $400 billion).
24. See Joseph Philip Forte, Disruption in the Capital Markets: What
Happened?, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 8, 12 ("Many investors [in
mortgage-backed investments] were relying almost entirely on letter ratings
25. See Roberta S. Karmel, Focus on Credit Rating Agencies Post-
Subprime Meltdown, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 2008, at 3 ("[The] abysmal record of
performance by the two largest CRAs has led to intense scrutiny of their con-
duct and calls for their regulation by various agencies.").
26. See H.R. 3890, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3214, 111th Cong. (2009);
H.R. 2549, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1073, 111th Cong. (2009).
27. See CalPERS Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; LeCroix, supra note 23.
28. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1687 ("[A] 2002 Congressional staff
study stated that rating agencies are 'officially shielded from liability for all
but fraud under their securities law' and are 'not held even to a negligence
standard of care for their work."').
29. See, e.g., Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs.
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a defamation
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and various other defenses30 to avoid liability for issuing rat-
ings that later prove to be incorrect. Congress's most recent at-
tempt to regulate the rating agencies arguably provides anoth-
er defense to claims rooted in state law: federal preemption. 31
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 gives the
SEC authority to compel rating agencies to publicly disclose
rating methodologies and any conflicts of interest that may give
agencies an incentive to overrate certain securities. 32 The Act
also contains a preemption provision, which states that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the
Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof)
may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statis-
tical rating organization determines credit ratings."33 The
preemptive effect of this provision is uncertain, but a growing
number of litigants and commentators argue that it prevents
most state claims against rating agencies.34
suit against Moody's and reasoning that the First Amendment protects the
rating agency's opinion).
30. See, e.g., Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a rating agency's letter to the plaintiff-investor that explained
that ratings are not intended to be relied upon for investment advice made
such reliance by the plaintiff unreasonable as a matter of law); First Equity
Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that Standard & Poor's was not in privity with consumers of the agency's opin-
ions).
31. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)
(2006) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the [SEC] nor
any State . . . may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organ-
ization determines credit ratings.").
32. Id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(ii) (methodologies); id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(vi) (conflicts
of interest).
33. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
34. See Suggestion of Additional Authorities at 9-14, In re Nat'l Century
Fin. Enters., Inc., No. 2:03-MD-01565 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2007) (claiming that
the Reform Act preempts state authority to regulate rating agencies); John
Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the 'Worldwide Credit Crisis": The
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improve-
ment, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 196 ("[T]he 2006 Act prohibits states
from regulating the 'substance' of credit ratings. State tort liability relating to
a subject typically is considered state regulation of that subject, so it probably
is preempted under current law." (citations omitted)); Larry P. Ellsworth &
Keith V. Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the Spotlight: A New Casualty
of the Mortgage Meltdown, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 35, 36 ("A
preemption defense may come into play where a state government or private
plaintiff challenges the methods by which credit rating agencies operate or de-
termine their credit ratings for securities."). But see Kettering, supra note 17,
at 1689 ("It would be ironic for preemption of tort liability to be the result of
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This Note evaluates the preemptive effect of the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and analyzes the normative
desirability of preemption. Part I describes the history of the
rating industry and the role of rating agencies in the subprime
mortgage crisis. Part II analyzes the preemption provision of
the 2006 Act and explains why it likely preempts most species
of state law claims against rating agencies. Finally, Part III ar-
gues to the extent that the 2006 Act does not preempt most
state claims against rating agencies, the Act should be
amended to make this preemption provision clearer. Rating
agencies should not face substantial state law liability for rat-
ings that turn out to be inaccurate because such liability would
tend to diminish ratings quality. To create a coherent, national
regime for promoting ratings quality, Congress should ensure
that plaintiff-investors cannot assert state law claims against
rating agencies.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RATING INDUSTRY AND
THE RATING AGENCIES' ROLE IN THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS
This Part traces the history of rating agencies from their
inception through their role in the recent financial crisis and
provides an overview of past attempts at pinning liability to
rating agencies for allegedly false ratings. First, this Part pro-
vides a history of the rating agencies up to the collapse of
Enron and describes the federal government's corresponding
regulation of the agencies. Second, it explains the role of the
rating agencies in the recent subprime mortgage crisis. This
Part concludes by summarizing traditional defenses to lawsuits
filed by investors claiming to have suffered financial loss be-
cause of inaccurate ratings.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Rating agencies began issuing securities ratings nearly a
hundred years ago. 3 5 Although the essential role of rating
the legislation, for the hearings held and reports written leading up to it
... never broached the notion that the general welfare would be promoted by
awarding the rating agencies immunity from any risk of tort liability on ac-
count of their ratings.").
35. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 300. Rating agencies were created as a response
to the financial crisis of 1837. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating
Industry, 19 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 1, 1 (1994), available at http://www
.newyorkfed.org/researchlquarterly-review/1994v19/v19n2articlel.html. Iron-
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agencies has always been to evaluate investment risk,36 the
scope, importance, and influence of rating agencies increased
dramatically since then.37 The SEC attributes this trend to an
increase in the number of entities issuing securities, the grow-
ing complexity of the securities themselves, and the globaliza-
tion of U.S. financial markets.38 Perhaps the most significant
factor in this expansion is the widespread incorporation of rat-
ings into the SEC's regulatory scheme. 39
Since the nineteenth century, rating agencies have under-
gone at least four significant transformations. First, agencies
now charge issuers a fee for rating a security. 40 Prior to the
1970s, agencies made money primarily by selling publications
containing their ratings.41 As the demand for ratings increased,
the agencies switched business models such that a majority of
their income came from issuer fees rather than from subscrib-
ers. 4 2 Indeed, without these fees, it is unlikely that the rating
industry could have expanded quickly enough to meet the ris-
ing demand for their services. 43
Second, ratings are now an integral part of SEC regula-
tions, thereby amplifying their importance to both issuers and
ically, more than 150 years later, the descendants of those agencies are being
blamed for spurring another financial crisis.
36. See Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The Interna-
tional Rating Game: An Analysis of the Liability of Rating Agencies in Europe,
England, and the United States, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 783, 784 (1993)
("Rating agencies are, simply put, predictors of a company's or even a govern-
ment's ability to meet financial obligations of its debt .... .").
37. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 13, at 5.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 5-8.
40. Kettering, supra note 17, at 1679-80 ("Since the early 1970s the dom-
inant rating agencies have received their compensation for the ratings they
issue in the form of fees paid by the issuers of rate securities. The vast bulk of
the rating agencies' revenues from their ratings business derive from those
fees."); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 308 ("Fees from issuers now comprise a large
percentage of annual revenues of many rating agencies. . . .").
41. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 12, at 308 ("Providing the service directly
to the investor, however, encounters copying and billing problems . . . .").
42. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
43, 50 (2004) (explaining the agencies' switch from a subscriber-fee business
model to an issuer-fee model).
43. See id. (attributing the necessity of issuer fees to the falling costs of
photocopying, which made the subscriber-fee business model untenable); cf.
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 648-49 (1999)
(noting that since the 1970s "credit rating agencies have exploded in size" and
are "more influential and profitable than at any time this century").
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consumers.44 Starting in the 1970s, the SEC began incorporat-
ing ratings into various regulations. 45 To simplify the SEC's
oversight responsibilities, regulators routinely incorporated
ratings into financial regulations. 46
Third, the securities rated by the agencies are more com-
plex than in the past. Whereas rating agencies began by rating
only traditional bonds, 47 they now rate highly complex securi-
ties, including the mortgage-backed products that collapsed in
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. 48
Finally, modern rating agencies aid issuers in structuring
bonds to a much greater degree than in the past.49 While the
rating agencies avoid characterizing this assistance as struc-
turing, they assist issuers by making ratings criteria available
so that securities can be advantageously structured to achieve
a desired rating.50 Ultimately, the courts and legislators must
decide how to interpret this activity, but to the extent that
agencies provide issuers with information that helps them gain
more favorable ratings,51 agencies are much more involved in
helping issuers create marketable securities than in the past. 52
These transformations developed in an environment of
minimal regulation of the rating agencies. Before 2006, no fed-
eral statute directly addressed the credit rating industry.53
44. See ALEX J. POLLOCK, AM. ENTER. INST., END THE GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED CARTEL IN CREDIT RATINGS (2005), available at http://www.aei
.org/outlook/21743 ("Now [NRSRO] really means one thing: SEC-approved rat-
ing agency."); Partnoy, supra note 43, at 690-91 (stating that the Securities
Exchange Act promulgated numerous "credit-rating dependent rules").
45. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that rat-
ings were first incorporated into SEC regulations in 1975).
46. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 35, at 5-6 tbl.3 (showing the pro-
gression of rules incorporating ratings).
47. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 302.
48. See Robert N. Rapp & Scott C. Matasar, Risk Modeling Implications
for Potential Rating Agency Liability to Purchasers of Subprime Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2966, at *1 (Oct. 2, 2008) (stating
that rating agencies rated residential mortgage-backed securities, which
played an integral role in the collapse).
49. See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the
heavy involvement the rating agency in the case had with structuring a bond).
50. See id. at 110 ("Fitch admits that it makes its ratings criteria available
to the subjects of its ratings, and that the companies often conform their
transactions to those ratings criteria."); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 312.
51. See Rhodes, supra note 12, at 313 ("During the rating process, issuers
are in constant contact with the rating agencies, seeking the rating agency's
feedback ... in an attempt to obtain a higher rating.").
52. See In re Fitch, 330 F.3d at 110.
53. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1675.
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This situation changed after the collapse of Enron, when Con-
gress took an exacting look at the credit rating industry. 54 Rat-
ing agencies were widely believed to have failed at apprising
investors who held Enron debt of the imminent collapse of
those investments.55 Legislators believed that the rating agen-
cies should have known that Enron was in trouble long before
its precipitous collapse.56
In response, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006, which represented the first substantial ef-
fort by Congress to directly regulate the rating industry.5 7 The
Act addressed perceived rating agency shortcomings in two
primary ways. First, the Act made it easier for upstart rating
agencies to gain the status of Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (NRSRO), a prerequisite for a particular
agency's ratings to satisfy SEC regulations that incorporate
such ratings.68 Second, the Act imposed significant disclosure
requirements on all agencies that voluntarily sought NRSRO
designation.59 These disclosure requirements compel NRSROs
to publicize their rating methodologies and any conflicts of in-
terest within their business model.60 The 2006 Act also gives
the SEC authority to issue rules effectuating the disclosure and
registration requirements of the Act.6 1
Thus, the regulatory environment for rating agencies im-
mediately before the subprime mortgage crisis remained limited.
54. See Pinto, supra note 18, at 343 ("The recent financial scandals involv-
ing large publicly traded corporations like Enron where credit rating agencies
failed to downgrade debt in a timely manner placed the role of credit rating
agencies on the agenda of financial reform.").
55. See id. ("[Credit rating agencies'] failure to reflect the financial condi-
tion of troubled issuers raised issues.").
56. Id. at 345.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006); see Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistent-
ly Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment,
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 248 (2009) ("Prior to the enactment of the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, the credit rating industry was largely un-
regulated.").
58. See Lynch, supra note 57, at 268 ("The Act establishes an express
process by which a credit rating agency can be deemed to be a 'nationally rec-
ognized statistical rating organization' ('NSRO'). Hence, it is designed to re-
duce the barriers to entry into the industry and, thus, increase competition
among rating agencies.").
59. Id. at 268-69 (listing the information that an NRSRO application re-
quires and stating that much of it must be publicly available and regularly
updated).
60. Id. at 269-71.
61. Id. at 267-75.
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The 2006 Act increased disclosure requirements but did not di-
rect rating agencies to adopt any particular rating methodolo-
gies. 62 The onset of the current financial crisis shortly after its
enactment makes it difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the Act's
disclosure requirements.
B. THE ROLE OF THE RATING AGENCIES IN THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS
Shortly after the 2006 Act became law, the early stages of
the recent financial crisis materialized. Investor confidence in
U.S. financial institutions plummeted following the collapse of
the mortgage-backed securities market.63 The bursting of the
subprime mortgage bubble precipitated a market collapse.
Leading up to 2006, an increasing number of subprime borrow-
ers found willing lenders. 64 During this period, subprime mort-
gages accounted for twenty percent of all mortgage debt.65
An unprecedented frenzy for securities collateralized by
mortgages fueled a surge in subprime lending.66 Large scale in-
vestors such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds
invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities. 67 These securi-
ties relied on steady principle and interest payments on the
underlying mortgage debt.68 Typically, these securities, espec-
ially those rated investment grade, were insulated from loss by
overcollateralization of the investment pool and subordination
of riskier tranches.69 With these protections in place, the entire
62. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 7 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 872 (noting that the 2006 Act "favors no particular business
model" and "encourag[es] purely statistical models to compete with. . . qualit-
ative models").
63. See CDOh No!, supra note 19.
64. See Forte, supra note 24, at 11.
65. Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 40.
66. See id. at 38 ("Almost all ... subprime loans ended up in securitized
pools .... ).
67. See Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDO Boom Masks Subprime
Losses, Abetted by S&P, Moody's, Fitch, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 31, 2007,
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajs7BqG4_X8I ("Many
of the world's [mortgage-backed securities] are owned by banks and insurance
companies .....
68. See id.
69. See CDOh No!, supra note 19, at 90.
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financial community seemed convinced that these products
would perform well indefinitely.70
But conditions changed.7' Many subprime borrowers, faced
with substantially higher monthly mortgage payments after
the initial "teaser" period, began to default. 72 As defaults and
foreclosures mounted, mortgage-backed securities became dis-
tressed. 73 These securities were designed such that there was a
margin of error protecting them. 74 But the sheer number of
borrower defaults surpassed this margin of error beyond pre-
vailing expectations.76
Once this margin of error vanished, investment-grade
mortgage-backed securities looked far riskier than previously
thought. All three of the major rating agencies quickly lowered
their ratings for large swaths of mortgage-backed securities. 76
Many criticized the rating agencies for giving these securities
such a high initial rating. 77 Finding it unjustifiable that the
rating agencies could give top ratings to securities in 2006
when the same investments fell below investment grade in
2007, investors, politicians, and others began to clamor for in-
creased rating agency liability. The next section describes tra-
ditional theories of liability leveled against rating agencies and
explains the often successful defenses the agencies typically
use.
C. THEORIES OF RATING AGENCY LIABILITY AND TRADITIONAL
DEFENSES
Some believe the rating agencies knew mortgage-backed
investments were far riskier than their ratings indicated, but
acted on the perverse incentive to please their issuer-clients at
70. See, e.g., Forte, supra note 24, at 11 (discussing former Federal Re-
serve Chair Alan Greenspan's confidence in the growth process of mortgage-
backed products).
71. See Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown:
Not Again!, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 42 (2007).
72. See id. at 45.
73. See Forte, supra note 24, at 11 ("The subprime business began to un-
ravel in early 2007 . . . as subprime loan defaults began to increase and inves-
tors began to distrust the AAA rating of [mortgage-backed securities].").
74. See CDOh No!, supra note 19, at 90.
75. See, e.g., id. at 90, 92.
76. See Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 41.
77. See, e.g., id. at 40; Waxman Grills Rating Agencies, DIRECTORSHIP,
Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.directorship.com/waxman-grills-rating-agencies/.
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the expense of accuracy. 78 Others argue that the rating agen-
cies are not suited to predict systemic market failures like the
one that occurred, and that the agencies are motivated primari-
ly by the incentive to protect their reputation for accuracy.79
These divergent opinions preview the arguments that litigants
are likely to make in litigation involving the rating agencies.80
Historically, rating agencies have had overwhelming success at
defending themselves in court.81 Investors have deployed a va-
riety of theories in lawsuits against rating agencies; to fend
them off, the rating agencies have relied on an array of tradi-
tional defenses.
1. Theories of Liability
Common law theories of rating agency liability to investors
for inaccurate investment information include claims of negli-
gent misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of contract. 82 For
negligent misrepresentation claims, investors argue that rating
agencies negligently issued inaccurate ratings, thereby breach-
ing a duty of care owed to investors to give accurate informa-
tion.83 Fraud claims allege that rating agencies knowingly is-
sued false or misleading ratings.84 Breach of contract claims
allege that investors are the intended beneficiaries of ratings
pursuant to a contract with the issuer. 85 As third-party benefi-
ciaries, investors sue for breach of contract when the rating
78. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 57, at 266 ("The subprime episode seems
to paint a picture in which the rating agencies, captured by the issuers, were
more than willing to accept that they lacked the resources to perform credible
and accurate analyses. Moreover, any inclination to conduct lax diligence
... is exacerbated by the issuer-pays conflict of interest. The desire to gener-
ate revenues and the explicit or implicit pressure from issuers increases rating
inaccuracies.").
79. See Rhodes, supra note 12, at 296. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 6-9 (developing the reputational capital view of the credit rating in-
dustry).
80. See, e.g., CalPERS Complaint, supra note 1, at 12-13.
81. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1688-89.
82. See, e.g., Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 334-36 (7th Cir.
1999) (detailing plaintiff's third-party beneficiary and negligent misrepresen-
tation claims against Standard & Poor's under Illinois law); First Equity Corp.
v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 178-80 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing
plaintiff's third-party beneficiary, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud
claims under Florida law).
83. See Quinn, 168 F.3d at 335.
84. See First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 179.
85. See Quinn, 168 F.3d at 334-35.
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agencies fail to perform as promised, for example, by failing to
issue and monitor accurate ratings for the sake of investors.86
Federal securities law arguably creates a private cause of
action against rating agencies when securities issuers make
material misrepresentations or omissions in information fur-
nished to potential investors.87 Entities that participate in
these material misrepresentations-such as accountants and
credit rating agencies-can conceivably be held liable under
these laws even though they do not issue securities.88 The par-
ticular statutory locus for these claims depends on the specific
type of and context surrounding the information provided by
issuers to prospective investors.89 All of these potential causes
of action require the same essential elements: a misstatement
or omission of a material fact, made with scienter, justifiably
relied on by the plaintiffs, and proximately causing plaintiffs'
injuries. 90
Plaintiffs are already asserting federal securities claims
against the rating agencies. New Jersey Carpenters Vacation
Fund v. HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust, a major subprime-
investor lawsuit against a rating agency, alleges that the rating
agencies knowingly issued overly high ratings for mortgage-
backed products in violation of federal securities law. 91 The
plaintiffs argue that they relied on these alleged material mis-
statements, which were incorporated into the offering materials
provided to the investors, in their decision to purchase Harbor-
View's mortgage-backed products.92 Thus, the plaintiffs allege
that they suffered damage proximately caused by the rating
agencies when the mortgage-backed investment market col-
lapsed and these securities dropped precipitously in value. 93
State securities laws may have lower scienter require-
ments than federal securities law for claims alleging that par-
ticipants in the purchase or sale of a security made false or mis-
86. See id.
87. See Complaint at 43-45, N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harbor-
View Mortgage Loan Trust, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08 Civ.
5093).
88. Id.
89. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 2001).
90. Id.





leading statements or omissions. 94 For example, Ohio law im-
poses liability on any party who aided an issuer in the making
of false or misleading statements "in any way."9 5 Ohio courts
have noted that the standard is very liberal.96 Ohio's lower
scienter requirement demonstrates that the rating agencies
could face more exposure to liability under state law than un-
der federal securities law. Damaged investors will argue that
the rating agencies aided issuers in making false or misleading
statements by providing inaccurate ratings for mortgage-
backed securities even though the agencies had modernized
risk modeling tools that, if implemented, would have revealed
the securities' true risk.97 Whether this argument is persuasive
remains to be seen, but as a general matter, the risk of liability
for the rating agencies may be greater under state securities
laws than under federal securities law.
2. Traditional Rating Agency Defenses
Perhaps the greatest barrier to liability for investors who sue
rating agencies is the First Amendment. 98 Though not universally
successful, rating agencies have consistently argued that they
are in the business of writing "editorials," and that they are
members of the financial press. 99 The Supreme Court has yet to
take up the issue of the rating agencies' First Amendment ar-
gument, but many commentators believe that the First
Amendment is not an absolute bar to rating agency liability.100
Though the rating agencies' First Amendment defense may be
94. See In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d
630, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
95. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43(A) (LexisNexis 2009).
96. E.g., Federated Mgmt. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 738 N.E.2d 842,
860-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ("[Tjhe language in [§ 1707.43] is liberal.
... [T]he language is very broad, and participating in a sale or aiding the sel-
ler in any way is sufficient to form a basis for liability. . . .").
97. Compare Complaint, supra note 87, at 34-35, with In re Nat'1 Cen-
tury, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 650-51 (outlining the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act's requirement that agencies provide information about methodologies used
to formulate ratings).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."); see Pinto, supra note 18, at 352.
99. See David J. Grais & Kostas D. Katsiris, Not "T7 e World's Shortest
Editorial": Why the First Amendment Does Not Shield the Rating Agencies
From Liability for Over-Rating CDOs, BLOOMBERG L. REP., Nov. 2007, at 1,
available at http://www.graisellsworth.com/RatingAgencies.pdf.
100. See, e.g., id.
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problematic for several reasons,101 past experience demon-
strates that this defense will prevail in some, if not all, sub-
prime-inspired investor lawsuits against rating agencies.102
In addition to First Amendment defenses, rating agencies
often have prevailed by arguing either that they owe no duty of
care to investors, 103 or that investor reliance on credit ratings is
unreasonable. 1 0 4 To bolster these defenses, rating agencies con-
sistently state that ratings are merely opinions and not in-
tended to be used as investment advice. 05 At least one recent
case demonstrates the ongoing vitality of this argument.106 Rat-
ing agencies admit that investors do, in fact, rely on investment
decisions when purchasing subprime mortgage-backed invest-
ments, but claim that the agencies counsel against this re-
liance. 107 Agency disclaimers counseling against investor re-
liance are typically found in small print. 08 Whether the
defense of unreasonable reliance survives subprime-inspired
litigation against credit ratings is unclear, especially given that
101. For a carefully reasoned analysis of rating agency First Amendment
defenses and their shortcomings, see generally Theresa Nagy, Note, Credit
Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalis-
tic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140 (2009).
102. Compare, e.g., In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (af-
firming a lower court's determination that a credit rating agency could not as-
sert a state journalist's privilege), with Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v.
Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming
dismissal of a defamation suit against Moody's by reasoning that the First
Amendment protects the rating agency's opinion).
103. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175,
179-80 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that Standard & Poor's was not in privity with
consumers of their opinions).
104. See, e.g., Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a rating agency's letter to the plaintiff-investor which explained
that he should not rely on ratings for investment advice made such reliance by
the plaintiff unreasonable as a matter of law).
105. See Stephen J. Crimmins et al., Subprime Mortgage Lending: Possible
Securities Litigation Exposure, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1455, 1459 (Sept.
24, 2007) ("Credit rating agencies have historically escaped blame by stressing
that their ratings are simply opinions and thus not actionable.").
106. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding, in a defamation action, that a credit rating is "a pre-
dictive opinion, dependent on a subjective and discretionary weighing of com-
plex factors").
107. See Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 67 (quoting a Moody's executive as
saying that "many people have the tendency to rely on [ratings]" and adding




the agencies are aware of widespread investor reliance on rat-
ings.109
If history is a guide, the rating agencies will assert the
First Amendment and other traditional defenses to avoid liabil-
ity for inaccurate ratings of mortgage-backed securities. In ad-
dition, Congress may have added another barrier to relief for
investors: federal preemption. The next Part analyzes federal
preemption issues arising from Congress's recent attempt to
regulate the rating industry.
II. A NOVEL RATING AGENCY DEFENSE: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION UNDER THE CREDIT RATING AGENCY
REFORM ACT OF 2006
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 represents
Congress's most significant effort to regulate the activities of
the rating agencies.110 The agencies' failure to give investors
timely warning of the imminent collapse of investments in
Enron's debt provided a major impetus for this Act.11' This Part
analyzes the preemptive reach of the 2006 Act by applying a
traditional express preemption analysis. Additionally, this Part
analyzes, in the absence of helpful legislative history, the prac-
tical considerations that militate toward treating credit ratings
as an exclusively national interest for purposes of preemption
analysis. Finally, this Part concludes that the 2006 Act, though
not entirely clear with regard to preemption, should be read to
preempt most state law claims against rating agencies.
A. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Rather than establishing government oversight and direct
influence over the methodologies used by rating agencies to
rate securities, the 2006 Act focuses primarily on compelling
the rating agencies to disclose material conflicts of interest and
rating methodologies to the SEC. 112 In fact, the 2006 Act con-
tains a provision that demonstrates that Congress made a pur-
109. See id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006); see S. REP. No. 109-326, at 1 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 865 (noting that prior to the 2006
Act the SEC had been criticized for failing to regulate agencies designated as
NRSROs).
111. See S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 1, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 865; Claire A. Hill,
Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145,
1152 (2003) (noting that "rating agencies were ... very late to downgrade" in-
vestments in Enron's debt).
112. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 7, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 872.
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poseful decision not to regulate the methodologies or substance
of ratings.113 In at least one case, a rating agency argued that
this provision expressly preempts state statutory claims, and
possibly common law claims, brought against rating agencies
by investors.114 So far, no court has construed this provision to
determine the extent of preemption.115
A constitutionally valid act of Congress preempts state law
when the act states in express terms that it intends to do So.116
The 2006 Act contains an express preemption provision prohib-
iting the SEC or any other state or federal entity from regulat-
ing the substance or methodology of credit ratings.117 The
preemption provision states that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, neither the [SEC] nor any state ... may regu-
late the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and method-
ologies by which any [NRSRO] determines credit ratings.""18 To
determine the scope of this provision a court would look first to
the text, and, if necessary, to the purpose and structure of the
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).
114. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630,
650-51 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
115. See, e.g., id. at 651-52; Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining
Rating Agency Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1111, 1143 (2009) (discussing National Century and concluding that the
validity of the rating agencies' preemption defense is an open question).
116. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). If no express provision exists, the Act may
preempt state law by implication where it is reasonable to infer that federal
law in the regulated area is "so pervasive" that Congress left no room for
states to regulate. Id. at 203-04. Implied preemption might also exist where
"the Act of Congress ... touch[es on] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject." Id. at 204. Because the 2006 Act contains an
express preemption provision, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2), this Note focuses on
an express preemption analysis and takes no position on the 2006 Act's im-
plied preemptive effect.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).
118. In its entirety, the preemption provision reads as follows:
LIMITATION.-The rules and regulations that the [SEC] may pre-
scribe pursuant to [this Act], as they apply to nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations, shall be narrowly tailored to meet the
requirements of this title applicable to nationally recognized statistic-
al rating organizations. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
neither the SEC nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) may re-
gulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodolo-





act.119 A plain reading of the preemption provision indicates
that Congress meant to limit both federal and state authority
to regulate rating agencies. The scope of this preemption ultim-
ately hinges on the meaning of "regulate" as the term is used in
the Act.120
"Regulate" is not defined in the 2006 Act. Therefore, it is
not immediately clear whether Congress meant "regulate" to
mean only affirmative, explicit regulation of ratings substance
or methodology or, conversely, whether Congress intended to
prevent states from conferring private causes of action aimed at
allegedly inaccurate ratings. Both Supreme Court jurispru-
dence and the ordinary meaning of "regulate" point toward con-
struing that word to include private causes of action.
The Supreme Court has said that providing remedies to
private litigants is a "potent method" of regulating conduct.121
The Court's view resonates with the ordinary meaning of "regu-
late": Black's Law Dictionary defines "regulation" as "the act or
process of controlling by rule or restriction."122 Because a judi-
cial ruling usually controls and restricts the behavior of parties
involved in litigation,123 the 2006 Act can plausibly be read to
prohibit private rights of action against rating agencies if re-
119. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) ("Since pre-emption claims turn on
Congress's intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction
with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the
structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs." (citation omitted)).
120. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1688-89.
121. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008) (quoting Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)).
122. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (8th ed. 2004); see, e.g., Noe v. Hen-
derson, 456 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2006) (adopting the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of "regulation"); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-
4182, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2009) (adopting the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of "regulation" and holding that "[t]he application of state law negli-
gence principles to assess and evaluate the suitability of the design and con-
struction of a railroad crossing, railroad tracks, and roadbed for railroad
tracks qualifies as an attempt at state law 'regulation' in respect to rail trans-
portation"); In re Bankr. Estate of Midland Euro Exch. Inc., 347 B.R. 708, 716
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (adopting the Black's definition and inferring that
'"regulated conduct' is . . . controlled by either judicial or administrative rule
or restriction").
123. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-
1446, 2007 WL 1662658, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2007) ("Imposing [liability for
negligence against the rating agencies] would . . . chill the agencies from vital
and vigorous participation in the rating process and the marketplace, where




sulting judgments have the effect of regulating (i.e., controlling
or restricting) ratings substance or methodology.
Subprime plaintiff-investors may assert that express
preemption analysis initially presumes that Congress did not
intend to preempt state law absent "clear and manifest" lan-
guage to the contrary.124 This presumption, however, loses
strength when legislation addresses a matter under federal
control. 125 Indeed, the current Supreme Court tends to read ex-
press preemption provisions broadly, especially when legisla-
tion addresses a significant national interest.126 Because the
term "regulate" is not defined in the 2006 Act, and it is unclear
whether Supreme Court jurisprudence requires a presumption
in favor of or against preemption, one must go beyond the text
of the 2006 Act to construe its preemptive effect.
Supreme Court jurisprudence dictates that one should look
to the purpose and structure of legislation to determine the ex-
tent of an express preemption provision when the text is incon-
clusive.127 Courts often look to legislative history to determine
the purpose of legislation.128 Unfortunately, the legislative his-
tory focusing on the preemption provision of the 2006 Act is
scarce and unhelpful.129
Despite the lack of legislative history focusing narrowly on
the preemption provision, existing legislative history surround-
ing the 2006 Act as a whole indicates that Congress determined
regulating the substance or methodology of credit ratings would
not improve ratings quality. The stated purpose of the 2006 Act
124. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("In areas of
traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not sup-
planted state law unless Congress has made such an intention 'clear and man-
ifest."' (internal citations omitted)).
125. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) ("[A]n 'assumption'
of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where
there has been a history of significant federal presence.").
126. See Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the Su-
preme Court, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'y PRAc. GROUPS, Oct. 2008, at 7,
8; see also Panel, Agency Preemption: Speak Softly, but Carry a Big Stick?, 11
CHAP. L. REV. 363, 387 (2008) (comments of Thomas W. Merrill at the 2006
Federalist Society's National Lawyer's Convention) (explaining why a pre-
sumption in favor of preemption should control when legislation addresses an
area under federal control).
127. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
128. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558 (2006).
129. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1688 n.447 ("Legislative commentary
on [the preemption provision] appears to consist of one brief vague paragraph
in the floor debates that contains no interpretative grist.").
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is "[t]o improve ratings quality for the protection of investors
and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparen-
cy, and competition in the credit rating industry."130 The only
significant congressional report accompanying the 2006 Act de-
clared that rating agencies "have been criticized by a broad ar-
ray of interested parties . . . [for] ratings that significantly lag
the markets."131 Congress chose not to address these criticisms
by directly regulating the substance and methodology of rat-
ings. Instead, the 2006 Act addresses its primary goal of "im-
prov[ing] ratings quality" by compelling rating agencies to dis-
close rating methodologies and conflicts of interest
(accountability and transparency) and clarifying and simplifying
the process though which a new rating agency can become reg-
istered as an NRSRO (transparency and increased competi-
tion). 132 Apparently to cement its decision to avoid directly reg-
ulating ratings, Congress attached the preemption provision,
which specifically forbids both states and the federal govern-
ment from regulating ratings substance or methodology.133
The structure of the 2006 Act further supports a reading of
the preemption provision that would preclude private rights of
action in all but a narrow set of circumstances. A provision
subsequent to the preemption clause clarifies that "[n]othing in
[this Act] may be construed as creating any private right of ac-
tion" against rating agencies registered as NRSROs under the
Act.134 A later provision mandates that "[n]o provision of the
laws of any State or political subdivision thereof requiring the
registration, licensing, or qualification as a credit rating agency
of a nationally recognized statistical rating organization shall
apply to any nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tion."135 The Act clarifies this last provision by stating that
"[n]othing in this subsection prohibits the securities commission
... of any State from investigating and bringing an enforce-
ment action with respect to fraud or deceit against any nation-
ally recognized statistical rating organization."136 These addi-
tional provisions, read together with the express preemption
130. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, pmbl.,
120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7); S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 2(2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 866.
131. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 1-2, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 865-66.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006).
133. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
134. Id. § 78o-7(m)(2).
135. Id. § 78o-7(o)(1).
136. Id. § 78o-7(o)(2) (emphasis added).
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provision, create a strong inference that Congress meant to lim-
it litigation involving rating agencies to suits brought by public
agencies to prosecute fraud. Congress easily could have in-
cluded language permitting a wider variety of claims against
rating agencies, making the interpretive canon of expressio un-
ius est exclusio alterius1 37 appropriate here.
The scope of the 2006 Act's preemption provision has not
been fully litigated and has been raised in only one known
case. 138 Ultimately, reasonable minds can differ in assessing
the Act's intended preemptive scope. 139 A dearth of legislative
history surrounding the Act's preemption provision adds uncer-
tainty to the inquiry.140 Normally, courts construe preemption
provisions narrowly, but this presumption applies with less
force when a distinctly national interest is at stake.141 Pre-
sumptions aside, the purpose and structure of the 2006 Act in-
dicate a likelihood that Congress intended to preempt all
claims against rating agencies registered as NRSROs except
enforcement actions brought by regulatory agencies on theories
of rating agency fraud or deceit.142 The next section argues
that, because ratings quality is a matter of important national
concern, the correct presumption is the one favoring preemp-
tion.
137. "[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or
of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). Congress
specifically allowed suits based on fraud or deceit, creating the inference that
if Congress had wanted to allow suits based on something else, such as negli-
gence, it would have.
138. See In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 651
(S.D. Ohio 2008) ("[The Court is not prepared to hold that [the 2006 Act]
broadly preempts state regulation, without the benefit of fuller briefing of the
issue and of what the phrase 'regulate the substance of credit ratings' means."
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2))).
139. See Kettering, supra note 17, at 1688-89 (acknowledging the merit of
opposite interpretations on whether the Act's preemptive scope extends to tort
law for allegedly inaccurate ratings).
140. See id.
141. Compare N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995) ("[We] have addressed claims
of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law."), with United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)
(explaining that when a national interest is at stake, there is no presumption
that the "concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police
powers").
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006).
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B. CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING THE TREATMENT OF RATINGS
QUALITY AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL INTEREST
Despite the frequent incorporation of NRSRO ratings into
SEC regulations since the 1970s,143 neither Congress nor the
SEC has ever regulated rating agency methodologies. 144 Even
in the context of the Enron collapse, Congress chose not to give
the SEC the authority to regulate the substance or methodolo-
gies of ratings.145 This trend arguably represents a collective
judgment made by Congress and the SEC that the goal of pro-
moting ratings quality is best served by the federal government
remaining neutral as to the substance and methodologies be-
hind credit ratings.146 Whether this longstanding federal policy
of neutrality toward rating methodologies requires courts to
abandon the normal presumption against preemption of state
law depends on whether one characterizes the goal of ratings
quality as a decidedly national interest.147
Practical considerations counsel in favor of viewing the
goal of improved ratings quality as a matter of national interest
for the purposes of preemption analysis. If the goal of regulat-
ing nationally recognized statistical rating organizations is to
promote ratings quality,148 and part of ratings quality is ratings
uniformity across jurisdictions, the 2006 Act should be viewed
as addressing a national interest. Faced with the threat of lia-
bility, rating agencies may alter ratings substance or methodol-
ogies; therefore, lawsuits based on state law may "regulate" the
substance of credit ratings just as effectively as agency-
enforced state securities regulations.149
To illustrate, assume that rating agencies can be held lia-
ble under Ohio's "in any way" standards 0 for their alleged
143. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 13, at 5.
144. Cf. id. at 9-10 (detailing the SEC's criteria for determining which
agencies deserve NRSRO status and including in this list no factor requiring
particular methodologies).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7.
146. For an explanation of why regulating the substance and methodolo-
gies behind credit ratings is best left to the rating agencies themselves, see
generally Schwarcz, supra note 79.
147. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
148. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 2 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 866.
149. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1446,
2007 WL 1662658, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2007).
150. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43(A) (LexisNexis 2009); see also Fed-
erated Mgmt. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 738 N.E.2d 842, 861 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000) ("[T]he language [in § 1707.43] is very broad, and participating in the
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complicity in helping issuers make false or misleading state-
ments in offering materials. Assume also, as some have, that
rating agencies could have implemented a model as early as
2002 to capture the true risk of subprime mortgage-backed in-
vestments, but failed to do so. 15 1 At least some juries-probably
many-would find the rating agencies liable under Ohio's stan-
dard and similar state securities laws. Investors in subprime
mortgage-backed products have lost billions of dollars. 152 If rat-
ing agencies can be held liable for these losses under theories
other than fraud, rating agencies likely would alter their meth-
odologies to avoid future liability, a result that amounts to
functional regulation of ratings substance and methodology. 153
The 2006 Act is an effort to improve ratings quality and
rating industry accountability by increasing competition and by
compelling rating agencies to disclose information regarding
conflicts of interest and rating methodologies. 15 4 The Act con-
tains explicit language indicating that Congress chose not to
address ratings quality through regulation aimed directly at
ratings substance or methodology. 155 Substantial rating agency
liability through private regulation would disrupt the balance
struck by Congress. Thus, the goal of improving ratings quality
is best viewed as a matter of national interest sufficient to de-
feat the normal presumption 15 6 against preemption of state
law. Therefore, courts should find as a matter of law that the
2006 Act preempts state claims against the rating agencies. In
sale or aiding the seller in any way is sufficient to form a basis for liability
151. See Lowenstein, supra note 16 (noting that Moody's first introduced a
revised model to evaluate subprime mortgages in 2002).
152. See Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 67 (noting the value of collateralized
debt obligation holdings declined in value between $18 billion and $25 billion
due to a lack of repayment by subprime mortgage holders).
153. Cf. In re Enron, 2007 WL 1662658, at *4 (arguing that imposing liabil-
ity against rating agencies for negligence would "chill the agencies from vital
and vigorous participation in the ratings process . . . where the free flow of in-
formation and conflicting views ideally establish reliability").
154. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 2 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 866 ('The purpose of [the 2006 Act] is to improve ratings
quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry.").
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006).
156. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (af-
firming the traditional assumption that a federal statute does not supplant




light of this analysis, Part III suggests that preemption of state
claims against the rating agencies is normatively desirable.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE
PREEMPTION PROVISION OF THE 2006 ACT
Thus far, this Note has argued that existing federal law
likely preempts most state law claims against rating agencies
without taking a position on whether federal law should
preempt these claims. This Part argues in favor of federal
preemption of state law claims against rating agencies, such as
CalPERS's common law negligent misrepresentation claim.
Substantial liability for rating agencies stemming from the
subprime mortgage meltdown would incentivize the agencies to
begin underrating securities, a costly result. 15 7 Conceding that
the preemption provision of the 2006 Act is less than perfectly
clear, this Part proposes that Congress amend the 2006 Act to
leave no doubt that private state law claims against rating
agencies are preempted.
A. THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST
RATING AGENCIES
Reliable, accurate ratings promote market efficiency by
providing securities information to investors in a cost-effective
manner.158 Ratings save investors from having to independent-
ly assess the risk of every security they may wish to purchase,
an alternative that would be costly both to individual investors
and the entire financial system.159 In short, ratings reduce
transaction costs by substituting the need for each investor to
do her own risk analysis of a security by performing the same
task once and making the results of this analysis available as a
public good. 160
As demonstrated by the Enron and subprime mortgage
crises, ratings are not guarantees that a particular security will
157. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 403-04 (2008) ("One
might argue that rating agencies should be more conservative, or that gov-
ernment should mandate more conservative ratings, but overprotection itself
has a cost.").





perform as expected. 16 1 Conflicts of interest inherent to the rat-
ing agencies' business model may have contributed to inflated
ratings that worked against the goal of reducing information
asymmetry. 162 Many subprime investors, relying to some extent
on the accuracy of ratings, collectively lost billions as a re-
sult. 163
The forward-looking issue is what, if anything, Congress
should do to respond to these failures. Various proposals current-
ly before Congress would tweak the federal regime for regulating
the rating agencies by mandating greater disclosure of rating
methodologies, decreasing regulatory reliance on NRSRO rat-
ings, attempting to alter the issuer-pays model, or expressly
creating federal private rights of action through which dam-
aged investors could seek redress.164 None of these proposals
address the potential effect of state law-based litigation on fed-
eral efforts to optimize ratings quality.
To develop a coherent regime for regulating the rating
agencies, Congress should evaluate the likely effect of claims
based on state law. The CalPERS suit sends a strong signal to
Congress that any national regime for regulating the rating
agencies will be incomplete unless it expressly deals with state
law claims. CalPERS is a sophisticated, major investor with
over two-hundred billion dollars in assets. 66 Accordingly, the
influence of the CalPERS suit against the rating agencies, if
successful, could be significant. 66 Furthermore, in the current
atmosphere of public anger over the financial crisis, a jury
might be predisposed to side with CalPERS, especially since
CalPERS provides pension benefits to more than 1.6 million re-
161. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 13, at 16 (describing the
rating agencies' failure to downgrade Enron's debt until four days before the
firm declared bankruptcy).
162. See id. at 40-41 ("The practice of issuers paying for their own ratings
creates the potential for a conflict of interest.").
163. See CDOh No!, supra note 19 (noting that banks that underwrote
mortgage-backed securities admitted to more than $30 billion in losses).
164. See H.R. 3890, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3214, 111th Cong. (2009);
H.R. 2549, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1073, 111th Cong. (2009).
165. See CalPERS at a Glance, supra note 2 (describing how CalPERS has
an investment portfolio of $203 billion in stocks, bonds, real estate, private equi-
ty, commodities, and infrastructure investments).
166. See Lifsher & Hirsch, supra note 5 (stating that "markets are paying
attention" to the CalPERS lawsuit and quoting a financial analyst who said
that CalPERS is "a 600-pound gorilla").
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tired California government employees.167 Holding the rating
agencies accountable for their failure to accurately assess the
risk of subprime mortgage-backed securities may comport with
notions of fairness and justice, especially when government re-
tirees number among the victims of these failings. However, to
improve ratings quality over the long term, Congress should
assess whether state liability of this kind is normatively desir-
able despite its current appeal.
The key question is whether Congress should allow plain-
tiff-investors to assert state law claims against rating agen-
cies.168 Observations regarding the relative superiority of mar-
ket forces over litigation as a means to altering rating agency
conduct provide guidance. Although liability for poorly perform-
ing ratings methodology may appease aggrieved investors in
the short term, it is unlikely to perform better than the market
itself at correcting the failures of the rating agencies.169 Of
course, this view is not universally accepted,170 but the way
that events have progressed since the subprime market col-
lapsed strongly supports it.
Once the market learned that the rating agencies assigned
overly high ratings to subprime mortgage-backed securities,
the agencies suffered immediate economic consequences.171 The
value of McGraw Hill's stock,172 which rose tremendously dur-
ing the subprime boom, fell so much after the collapse of the
subprime mortgage-backed securities market that a major
shareholder class action suit was filed against the company for
167. See CalPERS at a Glance, supra note 2 ("The California Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System is the largest public pension fund in the nation.
Based in Sacramento, the fund-known as CalPERS-provides retirement
benefits for 1.6 million active and inactive state and local government work-
ers, retirees and their families."); Lifsher & Hirsch, supra note 5 ("CalPERS'
chances of collecting any money would improve if it could get the case to a jury
trial....").
168. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 11 ("[I]mproving efficiency should be
the rationale for regulating rating agencies.").
169. Cf. id. at 13-14 (arguing that increased regulation of rating agencies
is unlikely to do better than market forces at improving the reliability of rat-
ings).
170. See, e.g., Kettering, supra note 17.
171. See Rating Agency Shares Fall on Report of EU Review, REUTERS, Aug.
16, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1635136420070816
(noting that rating agency shares fell after the EU Internal Market Commis-
sioner "highlighted apparent failings" in the ratings process for mortgage-
backed investments).
172. McGraw Hill is the parent company of Standard & Poor's, one of the
three largest rating agencies. See id.
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failure to inform shareholders that Standard & Poor's, the rat-
ing agency owned by McGraw Hill, routinely issued excessively
high ratings.173 The complaint alleges, essentially, that
McGraw Hill should have known and disclosed that its stock
price would plummet once the market learned that ratings for
mortgage-backed products were flawed.174 This suit illustrates
the market's immediate condemnation of the rating industry
for overrating mortgage-backed products.
By contrast, the SEC has instituted only modest new regu-
lation of the rating industry since the implosion of subprime
mortgage-backed securities. 75 Congress held hearings and is
considering various proposals, but has not taken any definitive
action.176 Private, investor-led litigation is only now beginning
to ramp up. Contrasted with the immediate reputational hit
that the rating agencies took in 2007, the protracted nature of
litigation likely means that the rating agencies will not feel the
effect of any substantial liability for years. If the rating agen-
cies do significantly alter their ratings practices in the short
term as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, it seems evi-
dent that such a response would be stimulated primarily by the
market's condemnation of their failings-a threat to their repu-
tational capital. '77
In the long term, state law-based investor suits against
rating agencies, if widely successful, would undercut federal ef-
173. See Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at 1-2, Reese v. Bahash,
No. 1:07-cv-01530-CKK (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2007) (alleging that Bahash and the
other directors of McGraw Hill breached their fiduciary duty to investors by
failing to inform them that Standard & Poor's regularly issued overly high rat-
ings for mortgage-backed investments).
174. See id. at 40-41 (alleging that investors would not have purchased
McGraw Hill stocks at the prices they paid, or at all, if they knew the market
prices had been artificially inflated).
175. See Marcy Gordon, Credit Rating Agencies: New Rules Proposed by
SEC, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/
09/17/credit-ratings-agencies-s-n_290603.html (describing SEC rules enacted
in September 2009 that require rating agencies to disclose the history of their
ratings actions and notify other agencies when they are in the process of rat-
ing complex securities); Wharton School, Univ. of Penn., Do the SEC's New
Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Dec. 10, 2008,
at 1, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?articleid=2112 (arguing
that SEC regulations adopted since the subprime crisis concerning rating
agencies lack "teeth").
176. See Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Bi (describing congressional hearings following the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market).




forts to enact a coherent, national scheme for regulating rating
agencies and could result in lower quality ratings.'78 Faced
with liability risks that vary across jurisdictions, rating agen-
cies would have the incentive to underrate securities, a result
which itself would hurt ratings quality.179 The greater the risk
of liability, the more likely agencies are to issue ratings that
overestimate the risk of loss for rated securities. Since riskier
securities typically pay a higher interest rate to investors, finan-
cial institutions would find it more difficult to profit by issuing
securities.180 Consequently, the entire financial market could
suffer, rather than improve. Taken to extremes, financial insti-
tutions would become less likely to invest in mortgages and
other types of receivables, promoting illiquidity and making
credit superficially expensive and difficult to obtain. 181
Allowing rating agency liability to investors based on state
law is unlikely to improve market efficiency. In fact, there is
good reason to believe that such a development would have the
opposite effect. To avoid this undesirable result, Congress
should act decisively to preempt state law claims against rating
agencies. The final section of this Note suggests how Congress
can amend the 2006 Act to make state law claims unavailable
to aggrieved investors.
B. A SUGGESTION FOR CLARIFYING THE 2006 ACT's
PREEMPTION PROVISION
Part II explained how the 2006 Act likely preempts most
state and federal claims against rating agencies. Nonetheless,
no court has construed the Act's preemption provision.182 Ulti-
178. See Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition: Evi-
dence from the Credit Rating Industry 11 (Harv. Bus. School, Working Paper
No. 09-051, 2009) ("Lower quality ratings mean that ratings will reflect things
other than expected repayment, and ratings levels will thus be less correlated
with bond yields.").
179. See id.
180. See Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that the lower rated securi-
ties command higher interest rates).
181. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 11 ("[If rating agency regulation was
based on factors other than economic efficiency, ratings would . . . reflect those
other factors. Investors, who typically look for the highest economic return for
a given level of safety, then would be misled, undermining their confidence in
the rating system and their willingness to invest in rated securities.").
182. See In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 651
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff's claims against the rating
agencies on the grounds that the 2006 Act preempts state blue sky laws be-
cause the issue had not been sufficiently briefed).
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mately, despite Congress's probable intent to preempt state law
claims, this provision may be construed to afford no protection to
rating agencies facing claims based on, for example, Ohio securi-
ties law with its low "in any way" standard or California com-
mon law. 183
The In re National Century Financial Enterprises plaintiffs
present two arguments against a broad reading of the 2006
Act's express preemption provision. 184 First, the National Cen-
tury plaintiffs argue that the 2006 Act's silence on the issue of
private claims against rating agencies is "proof that Congress
did not intend to pre-empt. . . private claims."185 Second, the
2006 Act "has nothing to do with the powers of individual or
private investors, only those of the state."186 This second argu-
ment contends that, because the 2006 Act focuses on new pow-
ers given to the SEC to oversee the registration of NRSROs and
says nothing about the rights of individual consumers of credit
ratings, the preemption provision is properly construed as a
limitation on state securities regulators, but not private indiv-
iduals. As the National Century plaintiffs' arguments point out,
the 2006 Act's preemption provision is ambiguous enough to
create room for disagreement about its scope.
If Congress agrees that increased state law liability would
work against improved ratings quality, it should clarify the 2006
Act's express preemption provision in response to the arguments
raised by the National Century plaintiffs. Congress is quite cap-
able of drafting clearer preemption provisions than the one
found in the 2006 Act.' 8 7 To this end, Congress should recast
183. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43(A) (LexisNexis 2009).
184. See Response of Lloyds TSB Bank PLC to the Suggestion of Additional
Authorities of Fitch, Inc. at 7-10, In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., No.
2:03-MD-1565-JLG-MRA (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2007).
185. Id. at 9.
186. Id. at 10.
187. One wholly unrelated but instructive example of a clear express
preemption provision reads as follows:
No requirement of any State or territory of the United States, or any
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, with respect to bond-
ing of packers or prompt payment by packers for livestock purchases
may be enforced upon any packer operating in compliance with the
bonding provisions . . . of this title, and prompt payment provisions
... of this title, respectively: Provided, That this section shall not
preclude a State from enforcing a requirement, with respect to pay-
ment for livestock purchased by a packer at a stockyard subject to
this chapter, which is not in conflict with this chapter or regulations
thereunder.
7 U.S.C. § 228c (2006).
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the express preemption provision of the 2006 Act to read as fol-
lows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial act of the United States, or of any individual
State (or political subdivision thereof), including judicial action
taken pursuant to private litigation, that has the purpose or
effect of regulating the substance of credit ratings or the proce-
dures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statis-
tical rating organization determines credit ratings may be enforced
against any nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tion acting in compliance with the provisions of this Act. Pro-
vided that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohi-
bit the securities commission of any State from investigating
and bringing an enforcement action with respect to fraud or
deceit against any nationally recognized statistical rating or-
ganization or person associated with a nationally recognized
statistical rating organization.188
This model offers at least four advantages over the existing
provision. First, judicial acts affecting ratings substance or
methodology are clearly preempted, foreclosing the question of
whether judgments entered pursuant to private litigation fall
within the provision. Second, the proviso to the preemption
provision, which excludes state securities agency fraud or de-
ceit actions, appears immediately after the preemption provi-
sion. In the current Act, the fraud or deceit exception appears
much later in the Act.189 Third, by adding the language "pur-
pose or effect" to the prohibition against regulating ratings
substance or methodology, the model clarifies that preemption
extends to any government action that affects ratings quality.
Finally, by inserting "including judicial action taken pursuant
to private litigation," the model clarifies that the Act's preemp-
tive reach extends to state law claims.
Adopting the above model would complement whatever
new measures Congress adopts for regulating the rating indus-
try. Even if Congress decides that rating agencies should face
an increased threat of liability, the contours of a liability re-
gime should be determined at the federal level. For federal reg-
ulation of the rating agencies to be coherent and comprehen-
sive, Congress should close the door on state law claims.
During this time of heightened frustration with the rating
agencies, Congress should remain focused on improving ratings
quality. Over the long term, the goal of ratings quality is better
188. The bolded sections indicate proposed additions and changes to 15
U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006).
189. See id. § 78o-7(c)(2), (o)(2).
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advanced in an environment where agencies do not face the un-
certain threat of liability from varying state regimes.
CONCLUSION
In the midst of the current financial crisis, it is under-
standable that aggrieved investors want to hold the rating
agencies liable for losses. The major rating agencies have all
but admitted that they failed to accurately apprise investors of
the risks attendant to subprime mortgage-backed financial
products. Investors collectively have lost billions of dollars,
partly as a result of overly optimistic ratings for these products.
Many of these investors, and the political figures charged with
representing their interests, want to avoid a repeat of this cri-
sis. As a means to this end, the prospect of expanded rating
agency liability seems appealing. Ultimately, subjecting rating
agencies to liability exposure that varies across jurisdictions
would be detrimental to the goal of improved ratings quality.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the best approach to rating agency
liability in the wake of the subprime mortgage meltdown is to
strengthen existing federal law to decisively preempt state law
claims against rating agencies. Any national regime for regu-
lating the rating industry will be incomplete unless it accounts
for state law claims.
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